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Abstract
This paperdevelops a two-industry model ofR&D. A monopolist supplier sells anin-
termediate good to an oligopolistic buyer industry where firms compete in quantity
andquality-enhancing R&D. The supplier can contribute to downstream product im-
provements by creating spillover knowledge which downstreamfirms use as a substi-
tute for their own R&D efforts. Evenifa market for R&D informationfails to exist,
the supplier may appropriate anindirect return on R&D for two reasons. Sufficiently
high levels ofspillover information lead to greater downstream product quality, and
spilloverinfonnationreduces the sunkcostofR&D necessary toenterthe downstream
industry. Botheffects causeanexpansion ofdownstream output and enhance the de-
mandfor the supplier's intermediate good.
Given sufficiently strong incentives for supplier R&D, the locus ofR&D shifts par-
tially from the downstream to the upstream industry. R&D intensities, technological
opportunities, and the industry structure ofthe downstream industry are determined
endogenously. The R&D behaviorofsupplier and buyer firms is characterized by
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Contributions to the economics literature on technological progress oftenfollow
the assumption that private incentives for research and development (R&D) are pre-
dominantly shaped by industry-specific characteristics, such as the degreeofcompeti-
tion, demand and appropriability conditions, and technological opportunities.1Forex-
ample, mostofthe theoretical models are essentially based on stand-alone industries
that have no connection to each other (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980; Lee and Wilde
1980; Levinand Reiss 1988;Loury 1979; Tandon 1984). Mostempirical papers com-
pare industries (orfirms) with respect to their R&D intensity and use industry-specific
measureS as independent variables (CohenandLevin 1989; Levin andReiss 1988).2
There are two reasons why the results ofthese models can be deceiving. First,
the analysis ofstand-alone industries reflects theassumption that it is mostly horizontal
(Le. intraindustry) competition for rents that matters. While intraindustry effects are
emphasized by.this methodological approach, the importance ofinterindustry relation-
ships and vertical interaction is often neglected. Considerfor examplean industry in
which one firm has a dominant position due to its technological superiority. Toalle-
viate the vertical distortion implied by the existence ofa dominant player, firms ina
supply sector try to support downstreamcompetitors of the dominantfirm in their at-
tempts to improve their own product or process technologies. The suppliers' strategic
incentives to affect the vertical distribution ofrents may exceed the "stand-alone" in-
centives offirms in thedownstream industry. Majorcontributions to technical change
atthedownstream level should then emerge in the upstreamindustry.
A second, but closely related problemofmodels based on stand-aloneindustries
is that they neglect potentially important endogeneities. Typically, theoretical and in
particularempirical work in this field is basedon the assumption that the technological
opportunitiesoffirms in a given industry are determined exogenously, mainly as a
function oftechnological contributions originating with firms in other sectors orinsti-
tutions like governmentand university laboratories. This view has beenfollowed by
Levin and Reiss (1988; 1984), Levin etal. (1985), and Cohen and Levinthal (1989),
among others. But the exogeneity ofthese measures oftechnological opportunity is a
problematic assumption.3 Firms in a supply sector may become technologically active
precisely because they observe that their customers do not innovateon their own. Asa
consequence, the supplierfirms may try to enhance the quality oftheir intermediate
goods, thereby providing the downstream sector with new technological opportunities.
Or suppliers may try to assist their customers by offering disembodied information
1Adetailed discussion ofthese issues is presented by Cohen and Levin (1989).
2 Among the few exceptions are Binswanger and Ruttan (1978), Jaffe (1986), and Mishina(1989).
3 Doubts regarding the supposedly exogenous characterofscientific knowledge have also been raised by
Rosenberg (1982, p. 159) who cOncludes that n(...) powerful economic impulses are shaping, direct-
ing, and constraining the scientific enterprise.
nthat is cost-reducing orquality-enhancing (or both). In these cases, the technological
opportunities faced by downstream firms are no longer exogenous, butendogenously
determined.
This view is supported by numerous case studies in which strategically moti-
vated R&D contributions by vertically related firms are evident. Forexample, a de-
tailed study of marketing practices relating to new materials has been provided by
Corey (1956). In his case studies, Corey analyzes the efforts undertaken by materials
suppliers toenhance the demand for their commodity products. The production pro-
cesses for products like vinyl flooring, several fiberglass products (like fiberglass.cre-
inforced pipe), aluminum bearings, vinyl film, and plastic toys were in many cases de-
veloped with considerable assistancefrom the leading materials suppliers. Thesefinns
also undertook advertising efforts and assisted downstream manufacturers in maintain-
ing product quality. Peck (1962) notes that aluminum prcxiucers had a major impact
on the design ofnew aluminum-using products. Grahamand Pruitt (1990) present a
detailed historical study ofAlcoa's efforts to develop alumimun beverage cans. While
Alcoa itself never integrated into can production, it contributed with major R&D ef-
forts to the development ofaluminum cans for beverages. Twootherdetailed industry
studies have been provided by VanderWerf (1990) who studies the occurrence ofma-
jorinnovations sinceWorld War II in two technical processes: thermoplastics forming
and molding andapplications ofindustrial gases. In both processes significant amounts
ofcommodity materials are used. Materials suppliers were identified as the innovators
in roughly one third ofthe cases. VanderWerfsuggests that the suppliers apparently
did not charge licensing fees for their innovations. They profited from their innova-
tive efforts by experiencing enhanced demand for their commodity.4
This paper tries to explore some ofthese issues by studying the interdependence
ofR&D incentives in two vertically related industries. I develop a two-industry model
oftechnical change in which R&D activities emmarked to enhance productquality in
the downstream industry are distributed across supplierand buyer firms. A monopo-
list supplier faces an oligopolistic buyer industry in which firms employ a factor of
production delivered by the supplier. The downstreamfirms compete in quantities and
in quality-enhancing R&D. Contrary to previous models ofR&D, I assume that the
oligopolistic downstream firms have access to two different kinds of R&D. Thefirst
type can be characterized as idiosyncratic, Le. specific to the firm's productand pro-
duction methods. The second typeofR&D is generic in that all firms can makeuseof
R&D results of this form, should they ever spill over across firms or should such
R&D be provided by external contributors.
4 Thearguments made in this paper may al~ be applied to a setting in which large buyer finns face a
number ofcompetitive suppliers. furexample, Leenders and B1enkhom (1988) provide case studies
in which large buyer firms seek to induce technical change among their suppliers by providing them
with R&D results.
2With an exogenously given downstream industry structure, the downstream
R&D incentives may be insufficient from the supplier's perspective. Producing a
substitutefor the downstreamfinns' generic R&D, the suppliercanaffectdownstream
productquality by i) increasing the equilibriumlevel ofgeneric R&Deffectively used
in product improvements, and ii) by enhancing the productivity ofidiosyncratic R&D.
As a consequenceofthe supplier's R&Dcontribution, downstreamoutputexpandsand
the supplier's factor demand is shifted to higherlevels. Given that the supplier sells its =.with a non-zero Price-~tmargin, its profit gross ofR&D expenditures isen-
When downstreamindustry structure is determined endogenously as a conse-
quenceofthe sunkcostofR&D, the supplier has the additional incentive to generate
interindustry spillovers in order to facilitate entry into the downstream industry.
Lowering the barriers to entry into the downstream industry allows a comparatively
greater numberoffinns to enter than would be sustainable in an equilibrium without
supplier R&D involvement. Greatercompetition in the downstream industry may af-
fect R&D incentives negatively, but this effect is dominated by the outputexpansion
caused by more vigorous competition among downstreamfirms. Again the supplier
faces increasedfactor demand which allows the upstream firm to appropriate anindi-
rect return on its R&D investment.
Independentofwhether industry structure is modelled exogenously orendoge-
nously, the equilibrium R&D intensities and measures oftechnological opportunities
arecontingenton the interaction between upstream anddownstreamR&Dincentives.
The transition between a regime in which the supplier is actively contributing own
R&D results and one in whichonly downstreamfinns contribute to quality-enhancing
R&D is discontinuous in this model. The switching equilibria characterized in the pa-
percan therefore be interpreted as supportfor the notion ofdistinct "technological
regimes."
Some institutionally oriented researchers have pointed out that innovation in
various industries can be categorized according to a few distinct "technological
regimes." Von Hippel (1982; 1988), for example, focuses onvarious functional roles
thatfirms in a vertical chaincan play and distinguishes between supplier innovation,
manufacturer innovation, and user innovation. Pavitt (1984) proposes a taxonomy of
three distinct patterns ofinnovation: supplierdominated innovation, innovation that
depends onlarge-scale production, and science-based innovation. Acs and Audretsch
(19'i57; 1988) follow a suggestion by Winter (1984) and distinguish two regimes, one
in which small finns are the predominant innovators and onein which new technolo-
gies are mostly generated by largerenterprises. Sofar, there has been noformal the-
oretical work to analyze the determinants ofsuch "technological regimes". This paper
applies the conceptoftechnological regimes to vertical relationships andformalizes it
ina model ofproduct innovation.
3The remainder ofthe paper isorganized in four sections. Section2 describes the
basic model andcharacterizes the equilibria in the two industries under consideration.
Section 3 studies extensions ofthe simple two-industry model. I analyze the implica-
tions ofintraindustry spillovers and the case ofa downstream industry with endoge-
nously determined industry structure. Some numerical examples complem<jnt the theo-
retical analysis. Section 4 concludes with some suggestions for further t~retical and
empirical work.
2. A Model ofR&D with Strategic Spillovers
The point ofdeparture for this paperis a "non-tournament" model ofproduct
innovation based on earlier models developed by Levinand Reiss (1988), Dixit and
Stiglitz (1979) and Koenker and Perry (1981). To simplify the exposition I will usea
stylized setup and assume initially that industry structure is-given exogenously.5
There are two industries in this model. Considerfirst the downstreamsectorin
which oligopolistic firms manufacture and sell a consumer product. Downstream
firms compete in quality-enhancing R&D and in quantities and receive a factor of
production at unit price u from an upstream monopolist. By choosing anoptimal fac-
tor price the suppliercan affect downstream R&D incentives. Furthermore, I assmne
that the suppliercanengage in R&D and generate spillover knowledge whichfunctions
as a (partial) substitute ofthe downstream firms' R&D efforts. Spillover productionis
a second strategic action for the supplier in this model, since the existence of in-
terindustry spillovers affects the R&D incentives ofdownstream firms. In the follow-
ing three subsections I first provide a more detailed descriptionofthe model, then
derive explicitsolutions characterizing the equilibrium in the downstreamindustry as
a function of the supplier's behavior, and finally determine the supplier's optimal
choiceoffactor price and R&D spillovers.
2.1 TheBasic Model
I assume that consumers ofthe downstream product are characterized by anag-
gregate utility function U(.) ofthe form '
where U'(.»Oand U"(.)<O. N indicates the numberoffirms in the downstream
industry, qj is the outputoffiim i in this industry (i=1,2,..., N) and Wi reflects the
5The implications ofendogenously detennined sunk cost for industry structure and R&D incentives are
discussed later.
4quality offirm i's product. The variable G will indicate the quality-weighted sumof
the downstream~' outputs. Qwill denote the unweighted sumofoutputs, i.e. the
industry's total production.
The utility specification (1) implies an inverse demand function Pi(G,<)i,Wi) of
the form
(2) Pi(G q' w·) =au aG =U'(G)'W'
, 1> I aG dqi I
Toobtain closed-form solutions I follow Levin and Reiss (1988) and Dasgupta
and Stiglitz 0980) and use specific functional forms. In particular, I assume that the
aggregate utility function is given by
(3) (0, E> 0) .
Firm i's inversedemandfunction Pi(G,qj,wi) is then given by
n
(4) Pi(G,qi,Wi) = a(L wiqi)-£ Wi
i=l
The parameter E in this specification is the inverseofthe elasticity ofdemand
with respect to price. 0 is a scaling parameter indicating the size ofthe market
Each downstreamfirm i can improve its own product quality Wi by making
R&D investments. Iassume that firms canexercise two complementary types ofR&D
activities. Thefirst type ofR&Deffort is completely idiosyncratic, i.e. specific to the
firm's variety ofthe differentiated product orits production process. Investmentsof
this sort will be denoted by Zi. The second kind ofR&D effort is completely generic,
i.e. its results could theoretically be employed by any ofthe firms in the industry.
However, I will\assume initially that each firm protects its generic knowledge per-
fectly so that no spillovers occur.6 The generic R&D investments will be denoted by
Xi·
Both types ofR&D investments contribute ina deterministic way to product
quality, Le. wi=wi(Zi,xi) where dWi/i)xi>O, dWi!<Jzi>O, d2wilaxi2.(O and d2wi/dzi2<O.
Furthermore, I assume that a2Wi/axidZi>O, Le. both types ofR&D are complementary
6 In section 3 Jdiscuss the effectofintraindustry spilloversand their relationship tosupplier R&D ince~
tives.
5inthe sense that greater investment in either type will enhance the marginal effect of
the other typeofR&D investment onproductquality.7
This specification attempts to reconcile two diverging opinions whichare both
widely held ~ng students oftechnical change as Nelson (1980; 1982) has pointed
out. On the one hand, it is often alleged that information held by a firm has public
goods characteristics, i.e. ifnot maintained as a secret, the information will spill over
to otherfirms, thus causing a failure ofappropriability (Spence 1984; Tandon 1983).
Atthe same time, many researchers have pointed out that knowledge has idiosyncratic
qualities, too. It may be specifically tailored to a given context, for example to a
unique production environment or product type, or it may be "tacit" in Polanyi's
(1958) sense and therefore hard to encode and transmit. Detailed discussions ofthe
cost of information transfer have been provided by von Hippel (1990), Kogut and
Zander (1989), Nelson (1980), andTeece (1977).
In the ~pecification chosen in this paper, a firm's knowledge orinformation base
consists ofboth components, but depending on the functional form and parameteriza-
tion chosen, eithercomponent may dominate the other. Forexample, ifthe marginal
effect ofidiosyncratic R&D activities is very small at all levels ofR&D investment,
then the conceptualization offirm's knowledge is similar to the one suggested by
Spence (1984) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). Conversely, ifonly completely id-
iosyncratic knowledge is productive, then even a full revelationofthe firm's informa-
tion will not have any adverse effects oneconomic appropriability, since competitors
cannotemploy the idiosyncratic R&D results generated by anotherfinn.8
Again it will be necessary to appeal to specific functional forms in order to
derive closed-form solutions ofthe model. A convenient iso-elasticspecificationofthe
relationship between product quality Wi and R&D investments zi and Xi is given by
(5) (a, ~ ~ 0).
Theparameters a and ~ are the (constant) elasticities ofproduct quality with re-
spect togeneric and idiosyncratic R&D investments. Note that both types ofR&D are
productive here as long as the respec~ive elasticities are greater than zero. By choosing
7The asswned complementarity between idiosyncratic and generic fonns ofR&D also reflects the con-
cerns ofCohen andLevinthal (1989) who point out that own R&D may enhance thefinn's capacity to
absorb anyexternally available R&D.
8Thisconceptualization ofa finn's knowledge also has implications for the modelling ofthe social
choice problem. Typically, theoretical models of technical change considerall private R&D wasteful
duplication and depict the social problem as choooing some socially optimal R&D investment The re-
sulting infonnation is then transferred to all finns (atzero cost) and employed by them. Given the
possibility ofidiosyncratic production environments or product differentiation, this idea may be un-
realistic and misleading. In this model wasteful duplication occurs only with respect to the generic
component ofa finn's knowledge pool, since by assumption the results from idiosyncratic R&D have
no value iftransferred toanotherfinn.
6different elasticity parameters, onecanapproximate the characteristics ofquality-en-
hancing information, Le. from highly idiosyncratic to relatively generic knowledge.
Sofar, the specification ofproductquality would not allow us to study theeffect
ofupstream R&D efforts on the downstream industry's equilibrium. Extending the
specificationofproduct quality to include the effect ofinterindustry spillovers, it is
assumed that the upstream supplier can produce a perfect substitute for the down-
streamfirms' generic R&D investment. Ifthe upstream supplier's R&D.investment is
y, then the downstreamfirms' productquality is given as a function ofR&D invest-
ments x, Z, and y as
This relationship can be given several interpretations, but I will only focus on
two that seem particularly in~eresting. First, one may view y as a measureofdisem-
bodied knowledge, provided to downstream finns by the supplier.9 In all likelihood,
the market for this knowledge will be imperfect (Arrow 1962; Caves, Crookell etal.
1983) so that the supplier cannot price the R&D infonnation separately. The reader
may think ofy as an intentionally produced interindustry spillover in this case.10
Alternatively, the upstream R&D investment y could represent the embodimentof
technological change in the factor supplied to downstreamfinns by the monopolist.
The production technology for the new downstream product isassumed to be
given and independent ofthe level ofproduct quality.11 In particular, I assume that
marginal costofproduction c is a function offactor input prices u and v, where u is
the unit priceofthe monopolist supplier's intennediate good and v is the price ofall
otherinputs. v is assumed to beconstant. Hence,
(7) c = c(u,v).
This unit costfunction is assumed to allow for substitution between the two
factors ofproduction with constant elasticity ofsubstitution Jl andto be homogeneous
ofdegree onein factor prices.12 Note that substitution between the twofactors implies
production with variable proportions and a concomitant vertical distortion (Tirole
1988). Hence, the supplier in the model below would have incentives to integrate ver-
9 See the introduction for case studies supporting this view.
10 Modelling yas asubstitute ofthe downstream finns' own R&D efforts can bejustified on the basis of
empirical studies. Bernstein (1988) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) find in several tests that in-
terindustry spillovers are sub;;titutes for the finn's own R&D investments.
11 An analogous two-sector model can be developed for cost-reducing R&D. See Harlloff(1991a).
12For thederivations that follow, the elasticity of sub;;titution}4 need not be constant atall price levels u
and v. The assumption is made here to avoid unnecessarily complex algebraic expressions. For the
same reason Ido not write marginal costcexplicitly as a function of}4.
7tically into downstream productionifintegration were costless. I asswne that the latter
is not the case, but as usual in vertical models, the integration alternative is not mod-
elled explicitly.13
2.2 Equilibrium in the Downstream IndustrY
Downstream finns take upstream decisions regarding spillover production y
and factor price u as given. The downstream oligopolists compete in quantities qi and
R&D investments Xi and zi. A downstreamfinn i maximizes its profits by choosing qi,
zi, and Xi according to the maximization problem
(8) MAX{Qj,l1,Xj} [Pi( L w(Zj,Xj;y)qj+ W(Zj,Xi;y)qi) - c(U,V)]qi - Zj - Xi
j..i
S.t. Xi, zi, ~ ~ O.
Note that the nwnber offirms N has to be small enough to exclude indus-
try structures where any finn would make a negative profit:
N
(9) [Pi(L wiZj*, Xj*; y) 'li*) - c(u, v)] qi* - Zj*- Xi* ~ 0 Vi E{I, 2, ..., N} .
j=l
Thefirst-order conditions for the unconstrained maximization problem(8) are
(10) Pi(.) - c(u, v) + °Pi(·) qi =0 ,
oqi
(11)
(12) oPi(·) qi - 1= 0 , Vi E{1,2,...,N} .
OXi
In the following analysis I will focus on symmetric Nash equilibria. Indices
indicating finns will be suppressed. Clearly, the equilibriwn solutions will be a func-
tion ofthe upstream monopolist's choice variables u andy. Let q*(y,u), x*(y,u), and
13 On empirical grounds this seemsjustified. Corey (1956) and VanderWerf(1990) find only rare cases
ofvertical integration in their studies. One may also appeal to the monitoring <n;tsassociated with
hierarchical organizations tojustify the assumption that vertical integration is not afeasible option for
the monopolist supplier.
8z*(y,u) denote thedownstreamfirms' choices ofquantities and ofgeneric and specific
R&D investments, given that the monopolist suppliercharges a unit factor price u and
produces interindustry spillovers y.14 Furthermore, let Q*(y,u) = Nq*(y,u) denote the
downstreamindustry's total outputas a function ofthe upstreamchoices.
Solving the first-order conditions to derive closed-form solutions one has to
take intoaccount that the downstreamfirms' choiceofgeneric R&D investment x may
be characterized by a comersolution. Ifthe supplier makes a sufficiently high invest-
ment in generic R&D, then downstreamfirms will have no incentive to invest in this
type ofresearch and will be contempt to undertake idiosyncratic R&D only. Hence,
the solutions will be contingent on the extentofspillovers y. Let x*(O,u) denote the
level ofgeneric R&D investment that a downstream firm chooses ifthe upstream mo-
nopolist does notengage in spillover production, i.e. y=O. Thenoneobtains by trans-
forming the first-order conditions and using the parametric specifications in (4) and
(6)










Total outputofthe downstreamindustry as a function ofy and u is given by
(16) Q*(y,u) =
{




Note from result (14) that as long as O<y<x*(O,u), both the supplier and the
downstreamfirms will contribute to generic R&D. Thedownstream firm's response
function x*(y,u) is linearly decreasing in y as long as y<x*(O,u). Since x and yare
14Toeconomize on notation the dependence on the functional fonn ofc(u,v) will besuppressed here.
9perfect substitutes, total generic R&D investment y+x*(y,u) will SUIUUp to the level of
x*(O,u) which a downstream finn would choose were there no supplier involvement.
Also, as long as y<x*(O,u), the downstreamfinns' decisions with respect to idiosyn-
cratic R&D z*(y,u) andoutput q*(y,u) will not be contingentonthe level ofupstream
R&D investment, as results (13) and (14) indicate. UpstreamR&D investments simply








Downstream R&D Investments x* and Industry OutputQ*
as a Function ofSupplier R&D y
10z*(.) andq*(.) will becomecontingent on the level ofy once the critical level
ofgeneric R&D x*(O,u) is exceeded by the supplier's R&D investment. By choosing
its factorprice u and its research investment y, the upstream firm caneffectively de-
termine whether the comersolution or the interior solution will prevail in the down-
stream industry. Theseaspectsofthe solutions areillustrated in Figure 1.
For (14), (15), and(16) to characterizean equilibrium onehas to suppose that
E>({l+~XI-E).Thefollowing derivations take this assumption as given.15








Equation (17) gives an expressionfor the intensity ofidiosyncratic research Z* ofthe
industry, given that the numberoffirms is equal to N. Equation (18) states the corre-
sponding result for theintensity ofgeneric R&D efforts X*.16
Using the results (13), (17), and (18) and inserting them in condition (9), one
can show that the numberoffInns N has to satisfy
(19) £ s N s £/(a+~) + £
£ S N SE/~ + £
ify=O and
if~*(O,u).
Therestriction £SN in (19) follows directly from inspection ofresult (13) while
the secondrestriction is a direct implication ofthe restriction to positive profits (9).
For the di'scussion ofthe supplier's maximization problem, it will be helpful to
study some comparative statics of these results. Note from (14) and (15) that the
downstreamfIrm's R&D investments x*(.) and z*(.) are decreasing in the level of
productioncost c(.) as long as demand is elastic (Le. 1/£<1). With inelastic demand
15This assumption ensures that the profit function ofafinn is locally concave. See Dasguptaand Stiglitz
(198:» in theirAppendix I.
16 By comparing (17) to (18) in the caseofy<X*(O,u) one can also see that the composition of the
downstream finn's R&D budgetwill beasimple function of the productivityofboth types ofR&D,
i.e. x*/z* =alp, which is not surprising given the Cobb-Douglas fonn ofthe quality specification.
Note that the deoompqsition oftotal R&D into twocomponents is in all likelihood not observable, but
itprovides aconvement conceptual tool.
11(1/£>1) the effect ofproduction cost is the opposite and higher cost levels will yield
greater R&D investments. The effect ofproduction cost c(.) on output is notcontin-
gent onthe elasticity ofdemand, however. Inspection ofresult (16) shows that the in-
dustry's output will be strictly decreasing in c(.).
The results also predict that the incentives ofoligopolistic producers to invest
in the improvement oftheir own products declines with the extent ofcompetition, i.e.
with the number offirms in the industry. This is a typical conclusionemerging from
non-tournament models ofR&D and innovation (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980; Levin
and Reiss 1988).
2.3 Equilibrium in the Upstream Industry
The supplier anticipates the behaviorofdownstream firms and takes into ac-
count that its pricing and R&D behavior will affect the downstream industry's output
and thus the demand for the factor ofproduction sold to downstream firms by the
monopolist. Thus the supplier is a Staekelberg leader in this model.
Using Shepard's Lemma, one can derive total downstream factor demandf(y,u)
for the monopolist supplier's good as
(20) f(y,u) = dC(U,V)/<Ju Q*(y,u) .
Thus the supplier solves the maximization problem
(21) ~y, u} I1s(Y,u) = (u-cg) dC(U,v)/<Ju Q*(y,u) - Y
s.t. y, u ~ 0
where Cs is the supplier's constant marginal cost ofproduction. To derive the
possible equilibrium solutions ofthis problem it is helpful to study two properties of
the function Q*(y,u) in result (16).
Proposition 1
The supplier will never choose to make an R&D investment y>O ifdownstream
demand is inelastic (£>1).
Proof: This result follows directly from observing that upstream R&D y has a
negative effect ondownstream industry output in (16) whenever £>1. Factordemand
will be shifted to lower levels ifthe supplier were to invest any amount y>O.•
As a second implication, note that the supplier will have no incentive to choose
any level ofR&D O<y<X*(O,u), since downstreamoutput and therefore factor demand
12are not affected while the ~st ofdoing R&D is partially shifted to the upstream sec-
tor.
Proposition 2:
With exogenously given industry structure and supplierR&D y being a peJfect
substituteofdownstream generic R&D, there can be no equilibrium solution in which
downstreamfirms and the supplier contribute to generic R&D simultaneously. The
supplier will never invest an amounC<><y<x*(O, u), i.e. he invests either y=O or
y>x*(O,u).
Proof: Suppose otherwise, i.e. at some factor price u the supplier invests y
where O<y<x*(O,u) such that the interior solution to the maximization problem in (8)
prevails. Butthen the supplier would always be betteroff to let downstreamfirms un-
dertake all generic R&D. Since output and product quality are not affected by the
supplier's investment (see Fig. 1), the supplier's profitgross ofR&D is notaffected,
but he incurs the costofR&D. Thus investing y where O<y<x**(O,u) cannot be opti-
mal.-
Proposition 2 implies that either the downstreamfirms will performall ofthe
generic R&D orthe supplier will peJform all ofthe generic R&D. Thus the first can-
didate for an equilibrium solution is characterized by y=O. In this case only down-
streamfirms invest in generic R&D and the supplier simply chooses the factor price u
such as to maximize upstream profits. Moreover, there is a second potential equilib-
rium in which only the supplier invests in generic R&D such that y~x*(O,u), i.e.
downstream generic R&D is completely crowded out. Clearly, the supplier will choose
the solution that maximizes profits. Theconditions under which one orthe otherequi-
librium will prevail can be then found by comparing the supplier's profit implied by
the two candidateequilibria
Case 1- No Generic R&D Investment by the Supplier (y=O)
Let the optimal factor price be denoted u* inthis caseand consider the upstream
monopolist's factor pricing decision. The corresponding first-order condition ofthis
maximization problemcan be transformed to yield
(22) u*- cs = ( df(y,u) _u_ )-1I
u* au f(y,u) U=U*. y=O
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spect to the factor price u. Let this elasticity be denoted b*. Onecan show (Harhoff
1991b) that b* can be written as
(~) 0* = k* 1-(a+~)(1-E) + (l-k*) !-l
E-(a+~)(l-E)
where k* is the share ofthe monopolist's factor ofproduction in downstream,produc-
tioncost
(24) k* = ac(u,v) _u_
au c(u,v) lu=u*
and !-l istheelasticity ofsubstitution between the twofactors,17
The result in (23) is a generalization ofpreviously derived expressionsJor the
elasticity ofderived demand (e.g. Waterson (1980». Ifwe simply neglect the possibil-
ity ofquality enhancing R&D by setting a and ~ equal to zero, then we obtain the
COrnnlonly known form ofthis relationship, i.e. b = kE-l +(l-k) !-l.18
Allowing for technical change, differentiation ofthe right-hand side in equation
(23) shows that 0*, the elasticity offactor demand with respect to factor price u, is
strictly increasing in u and~. The higher the downstream R&,D elasticities, the more
profitable it will befor the supplier to soften its pricing policy in order to shiftfactor
demand to higher levels. 19This relationship indicates that the monopolist supplier- in
order to increase demand spillovers from downstream innovation - will have to relin-
quish some'of its (static) market power, the more so the greater the R&Delasticities in
the buyer industry. .
Using the resUlts in (16) and (23), the supplier's profit fIs(O,u*) is now given
by
(25) I1s(O,u*) =~: [c(u*,v)E-lo(l-E/N) (alN)o(l-£)(t3/N)fl(I-£)]II[£-(Cl+f3)(I.£)]
=.l... k* c(u*,v) Q*(O,u*)
b*
17Details on the elasticity results are described in Harhoff (1991b).
18 See Allen (1938, p. 372-375), Bronfenbrenner (1966), Sato and Koizumi (1970), and Waterson
(1980). For an empirical test of the relationship between 0 and k ("Marshall's Third Law") see
Bradburd (1981).
19 With elastic demand a softer pricing strategy promotes downstream R&D incentives. Downstream
R&D will have a JXU1icularly strong effecton factor demand whenever the R&D elasticities ofproduct
quality are comparatively large. Conversely, with inelastic demand higher factor prices encourage
R&D, but R&D itselfaffects factor demand negatively.
14Thesecondequality in (25) shows that the supplier's profit~ be written as the
product ofits sales k*c(.)Q*(.) and l/b*, the inverse of the elasticity offactor demand
which measures the supplier's return on sales (gross offixed cost). Note that ifthere
are negligible opportunities for product improvements in the downstream industry (a
and ~ converge to zero), the result in equation (25) simplifies to the supplier profits
obtained in a world without technological progress.
Case 2- No Generic R&D Investment by Downstreamfirms (x*=O)
Once the supplierchooses an R&D investment ~*(O,u), the downstreamequi-
librium is determined by a comer solution. Downstreamfirms have no incentive to
invest in the generic form of research anymore and will engage in idiosyncratic R&D
only. The output and R&D response functions in (16) and (35) are now a function of
y, the supplier's R&D investment and ofproduction cost c(.) (which areafunction of
the supplier's factor price u).
Thesupplier's R&D and pricing decisions for this case can befound by evaluat-
ing the first-order conditions ofthe maximization problem (22), assuming the exis-
tence ofa downstream comer solution equilibrium. Let y** denote the the optimal
R&D investment and u** denote the optimal factor price.20Then
(26) u**-cs = _1_
u** b**
where b** - in analogy to (23) - is given by
(27) b** =k** 1- ~(l-£) + (l-k**) J1
£-~(1-£)
and k** is the mo~opolist supplier's cost share indownstream production, given
that he charges a factor price u**. Note that the elasticity offactor demand in (27) is
reduced in comparison to the previously derived one in (23). Hence, one effect of
generic R&D being shifted to the upstream sector is that the supplier's optimal factor
price will be higher, ceteris paribus. This change is a direct consequence ofthe incen-
tive effects offactor pricing discussed above. Once downstream firms stop to invest in
generic R&D, the supplier will no longer provide the respective incentives.
Evaluating the first-order condition for the supplier's optimal R&D investment
(again for the case ofadownstreamcomer solution) yields
20 Itis straight-folWardtodemonstrate that the supplier's maximization problem is well-defined in this
case.
15(28) y** = [( k** a(1-E) y>-fl(l-E) [c(u** vt-1o(l-E/N) (fYN)fl(l-E)]II[E-{u+tlXI-E)]
I 6** E-~(l-E) ,
which canalso bewritten as
Y** = k** c(u** v) Q*(y**,u**) a(1-E)
6**' E-~(l-E)
Using the last result one can show that once all generic R&D is done by the
supplier, upstream R&D intensity is a simple function ofthe elasticity offactor de-
mand(measuring the supplier's return to sales) anddownstrf!am parameters t, n, and
~:




Note that the supply sector's R&D intensity in (29) is increasing ina and ~, the
elasticitiesofdownstream product quality with respect to idiosyncratic and generic
R&D investments. Using result (28), wecanwrite the supplier's profit fIs(Y**,u**) as
(30) ils(Y**,u**) (1 )




FomlaIly, a necessary andsuffiCient condition for a supplier R&D investmentto
occur can be derived by comparing the supplier's profits ns(O,u*) and
IIs(y**,u**).The condition21
(31) ils(y**,u**) > Ils(O,u*)
can be transformed to
21 Note that I assumed the existence ofthe corner solution for the derivation ofresults (28) and (29).
However, ifcondition (31) is satisfied, then ns(y**,u**»ns(O,u*). Maximization implies
TIS<O,u*»TIs<O,u**) and we get TIs<y**,u**»TIS<O,u**) by implication. Using Proposition 2, we
obtain y**>x*(O,u**), i.e. a supplierR&D investment y** does indeed lead toacomersolution in the
buyer industry ifcondition (31) is satisfied.









x 6** E-~(l-E} .
(!!..)
N
(1- a(l-E) ) > 1 .
E-~(1-E)
Theright-hand side in (32) appears somewhatcomplex, but has clearly identifi-
ablecomponents. Thefirst two tenns reflect the differences in pricing due to the dis-
continuous changein theelasticity offactor demand. The third tenncaptures two ef-
fects ofupstream R&D. By providing y>x*(O,u), the supplierenhancesdownstream
productquality, since thelevel ofgeneric R&Demployedby eachfinn is higher than
in the caseofa stand-alone industry. Furthermore, due to the complementarity be-
tween idiosyncratic and generic R&D, the supplier raises the productivity ofdown-
streamidiosyncratic R&D. Thesetwoeffects enhancefactor demandandincrease up-
stream profits (gross ofthe cost ofR&D). Finally, the last term in (32) reflects the
supplier's costofR&D.
A simplified sufficientcondition can be derived by observing that - by defini-
tionofthe maximization problem in (22) - IIs(Y**,u**) > IIs(Y**,u*). Itfollows di-
rectly that
(33) ITs(Y**,u*) > ITs(O,u*) => ITs(Y**,u**) > ITS(O,u*)





(MJC. (1-E) .. ) e-(a+tlXI-£) x (1- a(1-E). ) > 1
6* E-~(l-E) £-f3(l-£)
The sufficientcondition (34) can be transformed into an inequality indicatinga
critical Herfindahl index for the downstream industry. Thus, generic R&D will be
perfonned by the upstream monopolist supplier if
17The interpretation ofthis inequality is strnight-fOlward. With increasing N, the
R~D incentives ofdownstreamfinns will suffer while the upstream supplierdoes not
incur negative externalities fonn enhanced downstream competition. Ceteris paribus, a
larger N will make supplier involvement in downstream product innovation more
likely. Note, however, that Ncannot be arbitrarily large due to the restriction (9) that
finns have at least to break even in equilibrium. Nonetheless, parametercombinations
which satisfy conditions (32) or (35) and condition (9) do exist. But the comparative
statics with respect to most parameters ofthe model are not straight-forward. A dis-
cussion ofthe effects ofvarious parameters is given in section 3.3 where several nu-
merical exaplples for the basic model and some extensions are presented.
Anothercomment concerns the switching property ofthe equilibria described
her~. A small change in the underlying parameters, e.g. in the R&D elasticities, the
production technology, or the demand elasticity can lead to a discontinuous switch
from a regime in which the supplier is inactive (in terms ofR&D) to one where the
supplier contributes substantially to downstream product innovation. I noted before
that this property ofthe model is consistent with seveml case studies that yielded a
taxonomic distinction between distinct "technological regimes."While the explicit
form ofthe solutions derived above depend on the convenient assumption that the
supplier's R&D contribution is a perfect substitute for downstream generic R&D, one
can obtain the switching property also with imperfect substitution between x and y.22
However, in this case the supplier's R&D investment will never lead toa full crowding
out ofdownstream generic R&D.
3. Extensions
This section briefly discusses two extensions ofthe model developed above.
First, I will introduce intra-industry spillovers and relate them to the supplier's R&D
incentives. Second, I will allow for anendogenously determined downstream industry
structure and show that supplier R&D will reduce entry barriers at the downstream
level and therefore lead to more vigorous competition. '
In order to focus on the effects of supplier R&D, I will assume in subsections
3.1 and 3.2 that the pricefor the supplier's intermediate good u is given exogenously
and constantat all levels ofsupplier R&D. This assumption also implies that the sup-
plier's price-cost marginr(equivalent to its return on sales) and the supplier's share
ofdowristreaIii production cost kare constant '
22 Forexample, one may specify product quality using the CES relationship w(x,z;y}=1fl(x++yeP)aI+.
Note that the previously used relationship (6) is nested within the CBS specification (with +=1). The
CPS formulation does notallow for c1(l)C(f-form solutions, but with +approaching unity the numeri-
callyobtained solutions for x*(y) get arbitrarilydaleto the R&Dresponses depicted in figure 1.
183.1 IntraindustIy Spillovers
The model developed in the previous section is based on the assumption that
generic R&D does not spill overfrom one firm toanother, since firms in the down-
stream industry can protect their knowledge perfectly. Suppose now that R&D ofthe
generic type is subject to intraindustry spillovers. In the presence ofintra- andin-
terindustry spillovers, productquality is now determined by the relationship
a
(36) Wi(Zj,Xi;x-i,y)=Zjfl(xi+ 6~xj + y)
j>ti
(0s6s1)
where x-i indicates the vector ofgeneric R&D expenditures made by the com-
petitors offirm i.The exogenously given parameter 6 in(36) denotes the degree to
which a firm's generic R&D investment is subject to spillover effects. If6=0, then
there are no spillovereffects and the specification in (36) reduces to the caseconsid'-
ered previously. Conversely, if6=1 then R&D results spill over fully to competing
firms, and generic R&D becomes a public good in the downstream industry.
The analysis ofthe supplier's incentives to contribute to downstream quality im-
provements follows the logicofthe previous section. It can be shown that - analogous
to the previous situation without intraindustry spillovers - downstreamfirms will stop
to invest in idiosyncratic R&D once the supplier's R&D investment yexceeds a critical
leveL Hence, there are no intraindustry spillovers then so that the results from the
previous section do apply in full for this case.
Itremains to analyze how intraindustry spillovers affect the results ifthe sup-
plier does not crowd out downstream generic R&D with its own investment y.
Clearly, the downstream firms'choices ofquantity-and ofgeneric and idiosyncratic
R&D are affected by intraindustry spillovers then. Let qe*(y,u), Xe*(y,u),and ze*(Y,u)
denote the res~tive equilibrium choices as a function ofthe supplier's R&D invest-
ment yand the exogenously given factor price u.
Using the same equilibriumnotion as in the basic model, it is easy to show that
the firms' generic and specific R&D investments in a symmetric equilibrium with in-
traindustry spillovers are given by
(37) xe*(Y,u) = [a(l-t/N)c(U,V)E-l (aJN)E (fVa)IJ(I-E) ]I1[E-<a~XI-E)] X
1 N - t (1 + 6(N-l» E-lJ(l-E)
x (1 + 6(N-l» ( N _t ) [E-<a~XI-E)] - y
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if Y<Xe*(O,u)(38) ze*(Y,u)=[o(l-t/N)c(u,vtl (fVN)£ (a/~)o(l-£) ]l![£-{u~XI-£)] X




Since t>~(1-£) by a previously made assumption23, the equilibrium investment
in generic R&D xe*(Y,u) is strictly decreasing in e, the degree of intraindustry
spillovers, no matter whetherdemand is elastic or inelastic. For the idiosyncraticR&D
investment ze*(Y,u) we find that with elastic demand (£<1), greater degrees of
spillovers across firms tend to reduce za*, while they cause the opposite effect in the
caseofinelastic demand.
Thedownstream,industry's total output Qe*(Y,u) can be calculated as
(39) Qe*(Y,u)= [o(l-£/N) c(u,viu~Xl-£}-l (a/N)o(l·£)(tvNf<I-£)]l![£-{U~XI-£)] x
X (




Theelasticityofdemand detennines whether spillovers have a positive or nega-
tive effect on industry output. As long as demand is elastic (t<1), industry output is
reduced since less R&D implies a reduction in product quality. In the case ofinelastic
demand, the model predicts a positive effectofspillovers on output.24
Naturally, these results are generalized versions ofequations (14), (15), and
(16) for the caseofy<x*(O,u). Setting eequal to zero leads us back to the model de-
veloped in section 2. The total R&D intensity ofthe downstream industry with in-
traindustry spillovers is given by
(40) xe*(.) + ze*(.)
pqa*(.)
a ( 1 - .L) + ~ (1 - .L)
1 + e(N-l) N N
if y<Xf}*(O,u) .
Thisexpression is equivalennothe R&D intensity in the Levinand Reiss (1988)
model. This is somewhat surprising, since their model is basedon a different specifi-
cation ofa firm's product quality.25
23 Recall that Iassumed £>(o+P)(l-E) in section 2ofthe paper.
24 With inelastic demand, decreasing productquality has a pooitive effectonoutput In the presence of
intraindustry spillovers, the quality indicator w=zhO(I+9(N-l»Uis decreasing in the degree of
spillovers 9. Hence a pooitive effecton industry output
25 Levin and Reiss (1988) specify the quality indicatoras Wi = XitJ (Xi -+aLXj )u. The interpretation ofthe
quality specification chalen in the mooel presented here is qualitatively SImilar to the oneemployed by
Levin andReiss. Nonetheless, the equality ofthe expressions for R&D intensity is slightlydisturbing,


















Supplier R&D Incentives in the Presence ofIntraindustry Spillovers
resultsin tenns ofR&D intensity. Thus, while using R&D intensity asa variable in empirical studies
helps to avoid numerous problems (e.g. accounting for R&D deflators (Griliches 1979) ordifferent
levels ofproduction cost), it may well be subject to ambiguities in that researchers cannot besure
which model they are actually testing.
21Intuitively, one would assume that the reduced downslreamincentives will make
upstream involvement more likely, since intraindustry spillovers reduce the down-
streamindustry's outputanq hence the supplier's profit as long as y<xe*(y,u). Thiscan
be shown ina formal argument replicating the steps from section3, butI will instead
present the graphical argument infigure 2.
Since the caseofinelastic demand is notofinterest here (see Proposition 1), the
presenceofspillovers unambiguously shifts the downstream firms' R&D investments
tolowerlevels. Infigure 2, the scheduleABC indicates a downstreamfirm's response
in generic R&D x*(y,u), given that the supplier invests some amount y and that there
are no spillovers. The schedule A'B'C represents the respective schedule xe*(y,u) in
the presenceofspillovers (Le. 8>0), ceteris paribus. Thetransition point between the
two regimes is shifted to the left-hand side.
Thelower partoffigure 2 depicts the supplier profit function for the twocases.
Spilloversdo not affect the supplier's profit function ifdownstream firms invest in
idiosyncratic R&D only, since this type ofR&D is not subject to spillovers. But the
supplier's profit is reduced in the caseofthe interior downstream equilibrium, since
downstreamoutputcontracts with increasing spillover rates ifthe supplier makes an
R&D investment Y<Xe*(O,u). The maximum supplier profit achievable without sup-
plier R&D investment is reduced, while the maximum profit achievable with a sup-
plierR&D investment y** is notaffected by downstreamintraindustry spillovers.
In terms ofthe situationdepicted infigure 2, the supplier will invest y=O given
the case thatdownstream generic R&D is not subject to spillovers. Conversely, inthe
presence ofspillovers the profit level IIs(y**,u) clearly dominates the respective
profit levellls(O,u), hence the supplier will choose to invest y=y**.
Evaluating the algebraic solutions, onecancompute the analog to condition (35)
(41) 1..( N - £(1 + S(N-I)) ) < (r k (1-£) )
N N - £ £-flO-£)
£-(u+fl)(l-£) £-(a+~XI-E)
( £-flO-£) ) a(l-E)
The left-hand sideofthe inequality is strictly decreasing in the degree of in-
traindustry spillovers e. Thus, according to this model, a higher degree ofintraindus-
try spillovers may cause either grea,ter interindustry spillovers or, interpreting the
supplier R&D effort as a quality enhancement ofits intermediate products, greater
quality ofintermediate goods. 26
26 Recent models ofR&D spillovers have focused on the JnlSibility that spillovers may actually encour-
age a firm's R&D efforts (e.g. Cohen and Levinthall989). ObViously, the relationship between inter-
and intrnindustry spillovers would be characterized by a negative correlation in this case. Oearly, this
is an empirical problem, but to my knowledge an endogenous relationship between the two types of
spillovers has not yet been discussed or investigated in the theoretical orempirical literature.
223.2 Endogenous DownstreamIndustIy Structure
All ofthe above results relied onthe assumption that the structureofthe down-
streamindustry is given exogenously. However, it can be shown thatthe incentives for
supplier involvement in downstream quality improvements are even stronger if
downstreamindustry structure is determined by the entry costofR&D.
Qualitatively, the supplier's R&D investment serves anadditional purpose in this
case. By reducing theR&D investments ofdownstreamfirms, the suppliercanreduce
the barriers to entry and thus allow a comparatively greater numberoffirms to enter
than wouldbesustainable without supplier investment inR&D. Greatercompetition
among downstreamfirms has two effects. On the one hand, total industry output (and
thus factor demand) will be greater the more finns enter the industry. On the other
hand, more vigorous competition also reduces the downstreamfirm's R&D incentives.
A complete analysis ofan endogenously determined industry structure in the
presenceofsupplier R&D is relatively complex, since the simplifying properties of
Proposition 2 can no longer be applied inthis case. Even supplier R&D investments
y<X*(O,u) will lead to a change in the supplier's profit, due to the effectofinterindus-
try spillovers on downstream industry structure. This means that equilibriaare theo-
retically possible in which both the supplier and downstream firms contribute to
generic R&D. I will leave this possibility aside andfocus onthe two cases knownfrom
the above analysis.
In the following I will assume that the only entry costs incurred by downstream
firms are those ofR&D. Supposefirst that the upstream supplier makes no R&D in-
vestment (y=O) so that we observe the equilibriumofa "stand-alone industry" where
thefree-entry numberoffirms is given by
(42) n* = E/(a+~)+E.
Now suppose that all generic R&D is accounted for by the supplier. Down-
streamfirms in~est in idiosyncratic R&D activities only. Thenitis simple to show that
the free-entry industry structure is characterized by a numberoffirms n** where
(43) n** = E/~+E.
Toconsideran extreme example, ifthe productivity ofidiosyncratic R&D is
zero (~=O) then the supplier's provision ofgeneric R&D to downstreamfirms will
yield a perfectly competitive buyer industry. Hence, the more productivedownstream
idiosyocratic R&D is, the more it will limit the supplier's poweralleviate the vertical
distortion. .
It can be shown that the possibility offree entry into the downstream industry
provides anadditional incentive for the supplierto invest in R&D. Assume thatcondi-
23tion (32) is satisfied, Le. even with an exogenously given number offirms n* the
supplier would invest y=y**. The supplier's profit is given by equation (30) inthis
case. Treating the number offinns N as a variable, onecan differentiate the expres-
sion for the supplier's profit and find that TIs(')is single-peaked and reaches a maxi-
mumwith a downstreamindustry in which the numberoffirms is equal to
For the case ofelastic demand and prcxiuctive idiosyncratic R&D (~>O)onecan
easily show that
(45) n* < n** < No
Hence, facing a downstream industry with n** finns is (ceteris paribus) more
profitable for the supplier than facing an industry with n* firms.
Naturally, condition (32) is too strong now and by comparing the supplier's
profit TIs(O)IN=n* (with zero R&D investment y and downstream industry structure n*)
to the supplier's profit TIs(y**)IN=n** (with R&D investment y** and downstream in-
dustry structure n**) one can derive the necessary condition underwhich the supplier
will again account for all generic R&D. Thecondition
(46) Ils(y**)IN=n** > TIS(O)'N=n*
can be transformed to
(47) TIs(y**)IN=n** =
TIs(O)IN=n*
(1- a(l-E) ) > 1
E-~(l-E)
Again, the comparative statics are not trivial. However, one canshow that for
low R&D elasticities ~, the profit ratio is increasing in a, the elasticity ofR&D with
respect to genenc investments. Intuitively, if ~ is fairly small the suppliercan - by
facilitating entry into the industry - achieve a substantial reduction of the vertical
distortion arising from downstream pricing above marginal cost . If a IS small
(relative to ~, Le. the difference between n* and n** is small), then the supplier's
24incentives to provide R&D results to the downstreamindustry approach the incentives
in the caseofanexogenously given industry structure.
Itis worthwhile to explain inqualitative terms why the supplier prefers to see
more competition in the downstream industry. An increase in the numberoffirms N
has two effects on industry output. First, due to the externality from competition
downstreamfirms will invest less in R&D and product quality inequilibriumis rela-
tively smaller, thus causing the equilibriumlevel ofoutput tofall. However, due to the
direct effectofenhanced competition on quantity choices, the aggregate output of
oligopolisticfirms is also increasing in the numberoffirms. Given the assumptions of
this model, the second effect dominates the first as long as the numberoffirms is
smallerthan No. The restriction to sustainable industry structures in condition(19) en-
sures that the latter condition is metand therefore the supplier's profitis unambigu-
ously enhanced byfurtherentry into the downstream industry.
3.3 A Numerical Example
Using the mathematical arguments above, onecan show that greaterfactor cost
shares k tend to enhance the supplier's R&D incentives. Similarly, the incentives be-
comeweakeras the the elasticity ofsubstitutionJl becomes larger, since the elasticity
offactor demand increases with substitution opportunities.
The effects ofother parameters are hard to determine due to the algebraic
complexity ofthis model. Thefollowing numerical examples can provide someidea
under what conditions supplier involvement in downstream product quality improve-
ments is likely. Suppose that the downstream unitcostfunction is given by the Cobb-
Douglas specification
(48) c(u,v) = UK v1-K
Choosing a Cobb-Douglas production function for the downstreamindustry is
convenient here, since the costshares are independentoffactor prices in this case. The
monopolist supplier's share ofdownstream production costs k is equal to K, the pa-
rameterofthe cost specification in (48). Theelasticity ofsubstitution implied by this
specification is equal to one. Factor prices and cost levels in the downstreamindustry
canthus readily becalculated.
In thefollowing tabulations, I distinguish three basic cases. Inthe first case, the
numberoffirms is given by n* (thefree-entry structure), butdoes notchange should
the supplier decide to invest in R&D. Furthermore, there are no intraindustry
spillovers in this case. The secondcaseis equivalent tothe first with the exception that
generic R&D spills overcompletely across downstreamfirms (i.e. 8=1). Finally, in
the third case there is free entry into the industry, Le. the numberoffirms is equal to
25n* ifthe supplierdoes not investin R&D, and it assumes the (higher) valueofn** if
the supplier provides the generic R&D results~ All ofthe calculations underlying the
results ofTable 1 assume that factor prices are determinedendogenously.
The parameters ofinterest are a and ~, the elasticities ofdownstream product
quality, and E, the inverse ofthe elasticity ofdemand. Table 1 compares the profit ra-
tio TIs(y**,u**)/TIs(O,u*) over a range ofparameter combinations. In each of the
three subtables, the elasticity ofproductquality with respect to idiosyncratic R&D ~ is
heldconstant tofacilitate comparisons..Cells with parametercombinations that do not
result in supplierinvolvement are shaded inTable 1.
It is clearfrom section3.1 that intraindustry spillovers favor supplier involve-
mentin the caseofanexogenously given industry structure. Similarly, comparing the
caseofan endogenously adjusting industry structure toone with a given number of
firms, it is clear that the possibility offree entry enhances the profitability of up-
stream R&D. These expectations are borne out by the computations summarized in
Table L
More interestingly, the tabulations demonstrate that greater opportunities for
idiosyncratic :R&D reduce the supplier's incentives to provide generic R&D to down-
streamfirms: holding a and Econstant, greater values of ~ always imply a lower ratio
TIs(Y**,u**)/TIs(O,u*) inall ofthe three cases considered in Table 1. This result is
not driven by the assumption that factor prices are determined endogenously here.
Recall from equations (23) and (34) that the supplier's R&D investment lowers the
elasticity offactor demand. This effect is the stronger the smaller the elasticity of
productquality with respect to idiosyncratic R&D. Hence, higher values of ~ tend to
reduce the pricing advantage that the supplier enjoys once generic R&D is no longer
undertaken by downstream firms. But more detailed computations show that holding
the elasticity offactor demand constant at the level given by equation (23) does not
alter the result that greater values of ~ affect supplier incentives negatively, ceteris
paribus.
26Table 1 Profit Ratio Ils(y**,u**)
lls(O,u*)
R&D Elasticities £ =.2 £ =.4 £=.8
a ~ Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
0.01 0.01 1.042 1.051 1.067 1.018 1.026 1.034 1.001 1.005 1.012
0.02 0.01 1'.051 1.070 1.119 1.025 1.041 1.061 1.001 1.009 1.023
0.03 0.01 1.040 1.068 1.161 1.025 1.048 1.084 (f99'Jl 1.0II 1.033
0.04 0.01 1.014 1.050 1.195 1.020 1.051 1.105 : 0.996 i 1.012 1.042
0.05 0.01 .O.<TIS:' 1.018 1.223 1.011 1.050 1.122 • 0.993; 1.013 1.051
R&D Elasticities £=.4 £=.8
a ~ Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
t:3 I
u. 1. 1 1. 1.
0.02 0.D3 1.008 1.056 1.010 1.026 1.039 :0:998" 1.006 1.019
0.03 0.03 0.!)g7 1.074 1.007 1.030 1.055 0.996 1.008 1.028
0.04 0.03 0.953 1.084 1.000 1.031 1.068 " 0.993 I 1.009 1.036
0.05 0.03 0.906 1.089 F\Q'i2QQ:: 1.028 1.080 "0,990, 1.009 1.044
R&D Elasticities £-.2 £=.4 E -.8
a ~ Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
0.01 0.05 "0.996 M 1.005 1.013 1.003 1.010 1.014 '''0:999 1.003 1.009
0.02 0.05 0.978 0.993 1.020 1.001 1.016 1.027 0.997 I 1.004 1.017
0.03 0.05 0.945 0.970 1.021 r O.9!;IS; 1.017 1.038 0.994 1.006 1.024
0.04 0.05 0.900 0.931 1.015 "'. 0.986 ~ 1.015 1.047 ; 0.991 1.006 1.032
0.05 0.05 0.843 0.880 1.002 ;j;),974;;:: 1.010 1.055 0.fJf![J 1.007 1.039
Case I: exogenously given industry structure (N=n*), no intraindustry spillovers in generic R&D
Case 2: exogenously given industry structure (N=n*), complete intraindustry spillovers in generic R&D
Case 3: endogenously given industry structure, no intraindustry spillovers in generic R&D
Common Parameters: J4=1 (Cobb-Douglas Cost Function), k*=.54. Concluding Remarks
This model demonstrates that industry outsiders (e.g. a supplier) may have R&D
incentives that dominate those ofthe producers ofthe respective good. The supplier's
R&D incentives discussed in this model are ofa strategic nature, since the returns to
the investment are appropriated in an indirect way viaenhanced factor demand. The
consequences ofthe outsider's investment can be striking. While downstream product
quality is enhanced, the R&D intensity ofthe industry is reduced once the supplieren-
gages in R&D. Furthermore, though the exogenously defined relationship between
product quality and R&D investment allows for two kinds ofdownstream R&D ef-
forts, the upstream involvement in R&D effectively limits the "technological oppor-
tunities" ofthe downstream producers.
The supplier's transfer ofR&D results can take theform ofintentionally gen-
erated interindustry spillovers. This notion contradicts the conventional interpretation
that spillovers are essentially a regrettable, but unavoidable byproduct ofresearch and
development. The production ofspillovers can be profitable ifthey convey - via some
externality - a beneficial effect on the originator ofthe spillover information. In the
model presented here such a mechanism exists, since the monopolist suppliercancap-
ture demand spillovers caused by downstream improvements ofproduct quality. In
addition, the model leads to the conclusion that intra- and interindustry spillovers may
be related phenomena.
An important conclusion is that one cannot interpreta comparatively low R&D
intensity ofa given industry as an indicator of an insufficient degree of technical
progress. Firms in the respective industry may simply take advantage ofR&D results
that are provided by outsiders out ofstrategic motivations. This result may explain
why the estimationofmodels that did not account for vertical interactionexplicitly has
produced unrealistically low R&D elasticities for some industries. Forexample, Levin
and Reiss (1988, p.554) comment that their estimates ofR&D elasticities appear tobe
too low in the caseofthe plastics products industries. Interestingly, the available evi-
dencefrom case studies (Corey 1956) suggests indeed that plastics materials producers
have engaged in considerable R&D efforts to provide process and product design
know-how to their buyers. Hence, the model presented here may provide a tentative
explanationfor surprising estimation results like the oneobtained by Levin and Reiss.
The model has particularly important implications for cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal empirical work that attempts to study the determinants ofR&D andinnovation.
It seems clear that econometric models at the industry orfirm level should include
variables that measure the R&D contributions that firms in a given sector receive
from otherindustries or institutions like government laboratories and universities.
However, treating such observed contributions as exogenous measures in a regression
framework may lead to biased estimation results. Somecare has to be taken to specify
the underlying processes that determine the extent ofoutside R&D contributions.
28The functional forms used in empirical work are of some concern, too. The
model developed here supports the notion ofdistinct "technological regimes," one in
which the supplier contributes significantly to downstream innovation and one in
which all R&D is done by downstream oligopolists. A transition between these
regimes can bediscontinuous, as it is the case in this model. Thecorrectapproach to
estimation would then involve a switching regression framework in which the transi-
tion between the two (or more) regimes is determined endogenously. To my knowl-
edge suchanapproach has not yet been used inempirical work onR&D.
While the above model has focused on quality-enhancing R&D in the down-
streamproduction process, a similar model canbedevised with regard to process in-
novations (Harhoff 1991a). Moreover, the mechanism of appropriating returns to
R&D viastrategically induced demand growth can be applied to a variety ofsettings.
The operating principle is simply that one sector can capture demand (or other)
spillovers induced by cost reduction or product improvement inanother sector. While
notmodelled here, one canapply this basic principle easily to industries with demand
complementarities or to monopsonistic players who may seek to induce price reduc-
tions among their suppliers.
Furthermore, the idea can be applied to othertypes ofintangible firm invest-
ments like advertising. Mathewson and Winter (1984) have pointed out that intra-in-
dustry advertising spillovers may cause linderinvestment at the retailer level which can
becorrected by upstream involvement in advertising. The model developed here sug-
gests that advertising at the supplier level may serve another purpose. The supplier
may attempt to prevent downstream firms from establishing many different brands
which lead to enhanced sunk cost expenditures and a reduction of the number of
downstreamcompetitors.Z7
Further research could progress iIi several directions from this point. Someof
the implications developed here need to be teSted empirically. Also, the robustness of
the results presented here should bescrutiillzed. since they dependonassumptions re-
garding the functional fOIm ofdemand andquaiity relationships. Finally, models other
than this non-tournamentexample should be used to test whetherindustry outsiders
may have signifi~tincentives to manipulate the industry's "stand-alone" equilibrium.
Z7 There appear to be recent instances ofsuch strategies. Forexample, DuPont is a supplieroffibers for
c~rpets that can be cleaned easily. These carpets are advertised under the DuPont brand name
"Stainmaster" and DuPont has financed its advertisement on national television and in other mediaReferences
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